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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).Zusammenfassung
In der Untersuchung werden zwei alternative Hypothesen getestet, die den Grad der Zu-
friedenheit der Bürger mit der Performanz der Demokratie in 18 post-kommunistischen
Ländern erklären sollen. Die eine Hypothese betont die Wichtigkeit der Garantie der indi-
viduellen Menschenrechte, die andere die Wichtigkeit der Verbesserung der ökonomischen
Situation. In dem einen Fall soll sich der Staat menschenrechtsverletzender Handlungen
enthalten ("virtues of ommission"), in dem anderen Fall soll er zur Hebung des wirtschaftli-
chen Wohlstands politisch eingreifen ("virtues of commission"). Der Befund zeigt, daß in
der Übergangsperiode vom post-kommunistischen zum demokratischen Regime den Bür-
gern der Zustand der Menschenrechte für das Urteil über die Leistungsfähigkeit der Demok-
ratie im eigenen Lande relativ wichtiger ist als die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung.
Abstract
Using the natural laboratory of 18 post-communist Central and Eastern European countries,
this article presents a basic model for democratic transition, specifically testing two alterna-
tive explanations for the degree of citizen satisfaction with the performance of their fledg-
ling democracies: 1) virtues of omission, which include bad actions from which the state
refrains, namely violations of individual human rights, and 2) virtues of commission, which
include positive state actions, in particular actions enhancing economic well-being.  The
findings clearly indicate that, during the transition period, citizens' sense of the condition of
human rights is consistently more important than are perceived economic prospects as pre-
dictors of democratic performance.Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Richard I. Hofferbert
Remembering the Bad Old Days: Human Rights, Economic Conditions,
and Democratic Performance in Transitional Regimes
[Potsdam, July 1992:  A conversation between one of the present authors and his friend, a 58 year-old car-
penter and resident of former East Germany, who had lived for 28 years across the street from the wrong
side of the Wall.  He had just lost his job.]
Q:  How would you compare life today with conditions before the Wall opened up?
A:  It was crap before.  It's still crap, but with sugar on it.
Q:  Would you want to go back?
A:  Are you nuts?  Of course not!
Q:  Why not?
A:  The freedom.
Q:  What do you mean by freedom?
A:  Only a professor would ask such a dumb question.  Look, it's the freedom to sit here and talk to you.  It
is the freedom to know I could go to America if I could scrape together the cash.  Sure, it's the consumer
situation, too.  But that is part of freedom.  Now that I have the Opel, I can choose to drive wherever I want
– and buy a cheap meal at McDonalds if I want to.  Now that I have a new stereo, I can listen to the music I
want, not that junk broadcast by the state.  Now I can go to the grocery and choose from several vegeta-
bles, not just a single kind of canned peas ordered by some bureaucrat.  Freedom means you can make a
lot of little choices every day in how you want to live, it's not just some vague thing for poets and politi-
cians. And it means not being scared of the Stasi every time my wife starts shooting off her mouth in public,
complaining about this or that.
*****
Social scientists, journalists, and politicians concerned with the transition and consolidation
process in the new democracies generally agree that long term success depends on devel-
oping a broad and deep consensus among the population regarding the propriety of the new
regimes. In this essay, we address two alternative explanations for the extent of citizens'
satisfaction with the performance of the democratic experiments in the post-communist
countries of Europe:
- The political explanation: Satisfaction with the performance of democracy in the transi-
tion years depends on the individual's perception of how well human rights are respected;5
- The economic explanation:  Satisfaction with democratic performance depends on per-
sonal economic circumstances.
These systems must build generalized as well as specific citizen support for the new re-
gimes, beyond approval or disapproval of specific incumbent authorities. (Easton, 1965;
Mishler and Rose, 1996)  Generalized support does not emerge overnight; it must be built
upon a record of acknowledged performance.  And, most often, analysts equate perform-
ance with economic performance (Lipset, 1994).  Macro analyses support this hypothesis.
Among the post-communist countries, those that have performed best economically also
have the highest percentage of people expressing support for the status of democracy.1
Support for the newly installed post-communist regimes was generally higher in the im-
mediate post-revolutionary period than later on.2  But the downward economic slide that
had preceded the fall of communism continued, for varying lengths of time, into the period
of democratic experimentation.  Some research suggests that there was a honeymoon period
of indeterminate length, during which the citizens showed some patience with the continu-
ance of inherited problems (Aslund, 1994; Balcerowicz, 1995; Broderick, 1998). However,
it was reasonable to assume that blame for continuing bad times would eventually shift from
the former communist rulers to the recently installed office-holders, if not to the new re-
gimes.  Several countries indeed returned more or less reformed communists to office, ei-
ther in the founding elections (e.g., Bulgaria and Romania) or a few years later (e.g., Poland
and Hungary).3  Variation in economic conditions over time and across countries is gener-
ally seen as placing some of the fledgling democracies in a precarious position (Lipset,
1994; Przeworski, 1991).
Yet if the demonstrators on the streets of Prague or Leipzig in 1989 or Vilnius or Mos-
cow in 1991 had been asked what they were seeking, few would have responded in terms of
economics or consumer goods.  Those demonstrations, while initially comprised of a high
percentage of young people, also, as they went on, included more and more middle-aged
                                               
1 In 1995 the proportion of citizens who were satisfied with the way democracy works in their country
correlated with percent change of real GDP .42 on the macro-level for 16 post-communist countries.
2 Balcerowicz (1995). For a more general perspective see Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi
(1996:42). The natural political experiments following the fall of European communist regimes in the
late 1980s and early 1990s are the most well-documented such events in human history.  Among the first
people on the scene after the fall were western social scientists and, particularly,  survey researchers.
Time series surveys that would have made Almond and Verba green with envy in their younger days are
routinely conducted and widely disseminated through the various data archives. Examples of these ac-
tivities are the International Social  Survey Programme (ISSP), the New Democracies Barometer (NDB),
The World Values Survey (WVS), or the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer Surveys (CEEB).
3 Powers and Cox (1997) show quite convincingly that voters' support for Poland's reformed communists
in the 1993 election was closely related to the extent that they blamed the new versus the old regime for
the ills of Polish society.6
and elderly protesters (Garton Ash, 1990).  The rule that people with families are hostages
to the status quo, at some point got suspended. If asked why they were engaging in such
risky behavior, the demonstrators would have answered, more often than not, for freedom,
not for a stereo, fresh broccoli, or a new car. And they would have meant it.4  Have they
forgotten?
With the adoption of democratic constitutions and competitive elections, by the mid-
1990s the process of transition from totalitarian rule had come to an end.  However, while
the formal structures of liberal democracy were in place, the durability of those newly es-
tablished structures remains uncertain.  While the likelihood of a return to a state-socialist
regime does not seem probable,  regression towards some form of non-democratic regime
or anarchy cannot be ruled out in some of the countries.
As the citizens of the post-communist countries struggle with the dual transition to more
or less democracy and to a more or less market economy, is the weight of history that they
carry an advantage or a disadvantage?  Does the concern for continuing economic hardship
overshadow the remembrance of human rights abuses under the old regime?  More specifi-
cally, in terms of the research reported here, which one better predicts current evaluations
of democratic performance:  assessments of the status of human rights or concern for eco-
nomic circumstances?
A Regime Transition Model
We offer the model portrayed in Figure 1 as especially fitting the circumstances of the for-
merly communist countries of central and eastern Europe, although it is likely to be of more
general applicability.  Our model suggests that a political regime is likely to survive when its
basic institutions and processes are supported by the citizenry, that is, when the regime en-
joys widespread legitimacy. A fact of democratic political life is the need to build legitimacy
among the citizenries of the post-communist polities.  In our model, we are careful to dis-
tinguish between political and economic outcomes, and, in particular, those political out-
comes we label virtues of omission as contrasted to virtues of commission.  Economic poli-
cies and conditions have ranked high among the strategies for consolidating democracy in
                                               
4 This distinction has a hallowed history in Central Europe.  Cross-sectional surveys were conducted in
Berlin before, during, and after the 1948-49 blockade and airlift.  Berliners were asked whether they
preferred a government that guaranteed them economic security and a good income or one that guaran-
teed free elections, and freedom of speech, press, and religion.  Just before the blockade, about two-thirds
choose the economic option.  But during and after the blockade, even under conditions of extreme mate-
rial privation, with people freezing and starving every day,  the percentage of Berliners who choose a
government guaranteeing fundamental freedoms nearly doubled. See Thome (1985).7
the post-communist countries.  Much attention has been given to policies that are risky,
costly, complicated, and often have uncertain lag and payoff between enactment and impact.
Figure 1: Regime Transition Model
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However, our thesis is that citizens' patience and approval of regime performance in the
transitional years are influenced more by the absence (or cessation) of undesirable state ac-
tion -- virtues of omission -- than by the presence of desirable action – virtues of commis-
sion. Of course, it is hardly deniable that legitimacy is enhanced when citizens perceive tan-
gible products from positive state actions, such products as we call virtues of commission.
The new regimes do not gain acceptance wholly by refraining from offensive actions.  How-
ever, the legitimacy of fledgling democracies is enhanced by certain virtues of omission, that
is, by the state's avoidance of delegitimizing actions. In particular during the early transition
years, citizens will, in good measure, judge the effectiveness of new, experimental democra-





Between 1989 and 1991, an historically unprecedented number of largely unexpected and
mostly peaceful revolutions dislodged the anti-democratic politics and command economics
of Europe's communist states. Whether this was brought about by external pressure (the
Cold War cost hypothesis), mass citizen action (the heroic revolution hypothesis), or inter-
nal collapse (the rot hypothesis) is not material to our analysis here.  That it happened rap-
idly, followed by dramatic political and (sometimes less dramatic) economic reforms is a
fact of life in that part of the world.
In contrast to most other participants in the Third Wave of democratization (Huntington,
1991), most of the communist countries of Europe had little warning or preparation time
during which to sequence a degree of economic reform prior to the political upheaval.
Thus, they were unable to ignore the need for simultaneous, broad, and deep political as
well as economic reforms, as depicted in Figure 1.  However, formal political changes, such
as elections, constitution-writing, and the dismantling of the secret police took place more
uniformly and rapidly than did economic reform. A short term improvement in individual
human rights conditions was more readily achieved than were the consequences of new
economic policies. Some of these countries adopted economic shock therapy while others
pursued a more gradual approach to currency reform, privatization, and removal of subsi-
dies and price controls.  However,  virtually all of the European post-communist countries
put in place at least parts of a package of political reforms (in particular elections, parlia-
ments, and parties) well before implementation of most economic reforms could even be
seriously started.  Likewise, the outcomes of political changes – freeing of political compe-
tition, reduction of fear for exercising fundamental rights – were clearly and broadly per-
ceivable well before such economic outcomes as increases in GDP, availability of goods and
services, re-designed social programs,  or reduction of inflation and unemployment.  Thus,
in terms of the model in Figure 1, we suggest that the political outcomes and their effects
on democratic legitimacy (line "A") proceeded more rapidly than the progression from eco-
nomic reforms to outcomes to legitimacy (line "B").
Richard Rose (1995) argues convincingly for conceptually distinguishing the absence of
governmental oppression, on the one hand, from efforts to realize material welfare, on the
other.  He adopts Isaiah Berlin's (1969) concept of freedom as a negative condition – free-
dom from – or what we refer to as virtues of omission.  The good condition is when the
state refrains from doing bad things, in particular oppressing its citizens.  Rose goes to some
pains to make clear that the absence of arbitrary oppression and the presence of the rule of
law guaranteeing certain domains of individual dignity are not logically or empirically de-
pendent on the presence of democratic governing structures.  The Rechtstaat held the King
of Prussia to the same legal standards as a common miller, but the King was not , by any
stretch of the imagination, a democratic governor.9
Political reforms embodying respect for individual freedoms, the virtues of omission,  are
reached as a matter of will and decision, largely independently of resource accumulation.  It
does not cost precious or absent monetary resources for public officials to refrain from ar-
bitrarily clapping citizens in jail or from abusing them once they are there.  It does not cost
serious amounts of money to hold public officials and ordinary citizens to the same legal
standards.  By and large, post-communist political reform was quick and extensive.  Rea-
sonably open, competitive elections were held within a few months, if not weeks, after the
fall of the old regimes.  New, more open media generally flourished quickly.  The bureau-
cratic apparatuses of oppression were, if not entirely dismantled, reigned in severely. Such
steps were not significantly dependent on a reliable revenue stream.
But it does cost scarce financial resources to maintain a system of positive services – in-
frastructure, education, health care, housing, economic stabilization – policies that we label
virtues of commission. Where such services are not provided, it may indeed be that stan-
dards of well-being accepted by some as part of the definition of democracy remain unat-
tained.  But such conceptual interdependence does not obviate the usefulness of separating
for analysis the form of government (e.g., democracy) from the outputs of governance
(policies).  Likewise, even if some empirical correlation is demonstrated, it is useful to dis-
tinguish virtues of omission from those of commission, that is, those bad actions from which
the state refrains versus those perhaps good actions which it actively performs.
The post-communist countries provide an excellent natural laboratory for examining the
relationship between conditions of freedom and the evaluation of democratic performance
(Rose and Mishler, 1996).  In established democracies, most of the virtues of omission have
been relatively secure for a long time.  Thus, citizens of older democracies lack the direct
experience with dictatorship that would be a basis for comparison.  This is in contrast to the
vivid memories of former times implanted in the minds of nearly all adults in the post-
communist countries.  Those memories are likely to last at least for the lifetime of the tran-
sitional generation. These distinctions are built into the model sketched in Figure 1. The
dependent variable is democratic legitimacy, to be measured in terms of citizens' evaluation
of a country's constitutional reality ("Verfassungswirklichkeit") that is the way democracy
works in a specific country. The virtues of omission -- Isaiah Berlin's freedoms from -- are
citizens' assessments of the status of human rights after the communist period. These
evaluations are indicated by line [A], the hypothesis being:
Hypothesis A:
The higher the citizen's estimate of the condition of individual human rights, the
more positive the evaluation of democratic performance.10
Although Figure 1 should indeed be read from left to right as movement through time, not
depicted is the fact that there are differences in the rate at which particular stages are
reached.  As we noted earlier, formal political reforms have generally been more quickly put
in place than have been radical economic policy changes.  Lipset has argued that this se-
quence is risky, especially for long term building of democratic legitimacy (1994; see also
Przeworski, 1991).  He argues that Perestroika should have preceded Glasnost.  That as-
sessment, we shall argue, underestimates the bridging function of reforms to enhance demo-
cratic values.  However, we must take seriously the differential in circumstances and the
relative disruption of economic security experienced by large segments of the population of
the post-communist countries.  And, as we acknowledged earlier, the evidence of a strong
relationship between economic performance and democratic satisfaction at the macro level
is persuasive.  In the present research, however,  we employ individual-level measures on
both sides of the equation.  There is no obvious reason why we should expect the relation-
ship to be different at the micro level.  Thus, the hypothesis implicit in line [B] in Figure 1
is:
Hypothesis B:
The more positive the citizen's estimate of personal economic conditions, the more
favorable the evaluation of democratic performance.
In western countries that have long been stable democracies, the evolution of congruence
between economic systems, political structure, and culture took place gradually, modifying
and reinforcing each other in stages.  In his classic article on the social requisites of democ-
racy, Lipset (1959) gives considerable attention to this staging process.  He reaffirms these
observations, with particularly skeptical reference to the post-communist countries, in his
1994 revisitation of the social requisites.  Historically relatively relaxed patterns of struc-
tural and cultural change, however, are a luxury not always provided peoples eager to be rid
of anti-democratic politics and command economics.
Civil Society, comprised of diverse domains for human deliberation and action beyond the
immediate reach of the state, takes time to build, especially in the wake of regimes that set
out conscientiously to establish state monopolies over virtually all spheres of social interac-
tion. Such features of civil society as autonomous unions, churches, and other private asso-
ciations do not emerge overnight with the removal of their prohibition.  And the habits of
individual and collective responsibility – civic culture – that are reinforced by the diversity
of domains of action in a civil society take even longer to develop.
Civic culture is the bundle of norms held by citizens that reciprocally relate to the struc-
tural elements of civil society (Almond and Verba, 1963).  Thus attention is directed to the11
importance of a democratic political culture in trying to explain or predict the persistence of
liberal democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.  Civic culture, as a feature of the common
value system of a population, legitimizes the institutional arrangements of liberal democ-
racy,  but it may require more time to build than provided by the window of opportunity in
the immediate post-communist period.  This developmental process is illustrated in Figure 1
by the shaded box and the lines connecting it to political outcomes, economic outcomes,
and democratic legitimacy.  As these reciprocal processes unfold, with institutionalization of
political outputs, improvement in economic outputs, and consequent growth of democratic
legitimacy, the foundation stones of civil society and civic culture will be laid ever more
securely, thus enhancing the regime's capacity to survive shocks such as economic reverses,
governmental scandals, or crime waves.
A number of empirical studies have shown that citizens of Central and Eastern Europe
have a high level of support for democratic values and institutions, at least as abstract con-
cepts.  People there affirm that they think democracy is a good idea (Rose, 1995).  This
finding, however, has been interpreted in different ways.  Frederick Weil (1989), Dieter
Fuchs and Edeltraud Roller (1994), and others argue that the high level of support for
democratic values and institutions is not strongly rooted.  It is, rather, based on uncritical
impressions of western conditions, not on any personal experience or indigenous socializa-
tion process.  Thus, Fuchs and Roller observe:  "Although this type of support is expressive
of a positive assessment, it is nonetheless superficial, thus being relatively volatile in the face
of concrete experience." (Fuchs and Roller 1994:13)
A quite different position is argued by Rose (1995).  Writing on "freedom as a funda-
mental value," he demonstrates empirically (in 14 Central and Eastern European countries)
a very high degree of popular appreciation for freedom as a central political value.  And he
concludes:  "Whatever credit the Soviet system gained for its positive achievements, this did
not blind subjects to the regime's interference with and obstruction of activities that in a civil
society are outside the bounds of state control.  The readiness of people in many different
societies and cultures to recognize great gains in freedom from state interference implies
that the desire for freedom was repressed but not erased by two generations of indoctrina-
tion."
These two positions, one emphasizing the fragility of such values and the other suggest-
ing that they endure under harsh conditions, can, in fact, be reconciled.  On the one hand,
there is no doubt that a value like freedom is deeply rooted and not just superficially held by
the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe.  Such values, on the other hand, serve as yard-
sticks against which the reality of the democratic process in a given country will be evalu-
ated.  Thus, both aspects are important – the holding of democratic values and the way de-
mocracy actually develops in a country.12
When system outcomes are congruent with citizen expectations, then the system is posi-
tively evaluated (Lipset, 1959 and 1960; Linz, 1988 and 1996: Dahl, 1989).  A number of
empirical studies have demonstrated that the elements of this model indeed have quite a lot
of explanatory power.  It has particular plausibility for anyone who has studied the devel-
opment of a democratic political culture in post-World War II Germany (Dalton, 1988).
There, the institutions of liberal democracy were imposed by the victorious allies. But the
economic progress that ensued certainly helped to generate support for the new regime, to
the point that severe economic reverses, such as those coming in the wake of unification in
the 1990s, could be weathered without serious consequences for regime support. The impli-
cation of the model sketched in Figure 1 is that citizens keep a sort of running tally on the
performance of the system (Kuechler, 1991: 280).
The political outputs in Hypothesis A are intrinsic to a democracy (Fuchs, 1998).  The
question they present is not about economic growth, inflation, unemployment or welfare
services, but rather about the extent to which conditions attained in the democratic system
satisfy the normative expectations enshrined in the institutions.  Thus, the perceived differ-
ence between constitutional norms and constitutional reality forms the basis upon which
citizens base their evaluation of democratic performance.
The economic outputs of Hypothesis B are extrinsic to democracy.  They reflect the
problem-solving competence of any political system, not specifically democracies.  How-
ever, democratic regimes must eventually also deliver these goods, including a degree of
law and order, protection from external conquest, and some level of social and economic
development.  In most attempts to analyze the relationship between outputs and assess-
ments of the status of democracy,  the emphasis has been on economic performance.5  This
is particularly true for research at the macro level, which has been highly influenced by Lip-
set's famous dictum:  "The better the economic situation, the higher the level of support for
the democratic system."  (Lipset, 1959)  Democratic performance, as measured for example
by the Comparative Studies of Freedom carried out annually by the Freedom House survey
team, has rarely been used as an independent variable in such research using countries as the
units of analysis.
A similar argument must be made for micro-level analyses which focus on the attitudes of
citizens.  Perceptions of economic and welfare-state performance are mainly used to predict
support for democracy.  In his article on freedom,  Rose (1995) rightly points to the fact
that survey data on democratic performance are conspicuously lacking.  On the one hand,
                                               
5 A notable exception is Anderson and Guillory (1997), who demonstrate a strong relationship at the
macro- level  between structures of representation (proportional versus majoritarian) and the aggregate
satisfaction of winners and losers of European elections.  Their set of cases includes mostly Western
European countries, but a few formerly communist systems are also examined.13
he notes, it is rarely possible to do surveys for regimes that oppress their subjects.  Such
research is normally obstructed or forbidden.  On the other hand, such surveys are, para-
doxically, also difficult to conduct in societies where freedom from state interference is long
established.  The idea that the state could censor what is said, unlawfully imprison individu-
als, or forbid or compel religious worship appears difficult for most people in established
democracies to conceive (Rose 1995, 461).  As a consequence, we do not know much
about the relative importance of individual perceptions of economic versus political per-
formance on support for democracy.  Yet such knowledge is of more than academic inter-
est.  Would it turn out that economic performance is the primary source of support for the
new institutions of fledgling democracies, then failure to deliver speedy results might lead
people to look for an alternative form of regime.  On the other hand, dissatisfaction with
democratic performance, that is with political outputs, might lead a country to look for a
rearrangement of democratic institutions and processes while still clearly remaining a mem-
ber of the family of democratic states.
Empirical Evidence
Since our theoretical concern is with individual attitudes, the analysis is limited to survey
data. We keep the design as simple as possible. That is, we relate the following three indi-
cators (with their equivalents in the transition model, Figure 1, in parentheses):
– Individual assessment of democratic performance is the dependent variable
(legitimacy).
– The first independent variable (Hypothesis A) is evaluation of human rights conditions
(political outcomes).
– The second independent variable (Hypothesis B) is the perceived economic performance
of the system (economic outcomes).
The individual level analysis is replicated in 18 Central and Eastern European countries us-
ing survey data collected in the fall of 1995.6  All surveys consist of a representative na-
tional sample of the adult population (over 18).  We cover three Slavic countries (Russia,
                                               
6 CEEB 6 (1995) ZA-Study-No. 2802. Included countries: Albania (N=893), Armenia (N=913), Belarus
(N=1001), Bulgaria (N=1013), Croatia (N=946), Czech Republic (N=1029), Slovakia (N=1044), Estonia
(N=940), Hungary (N=964), Latvia (N=1054), Lithuania (N=934), Macedonia (N=902), Poland
(N=989), Romania (N=1105), Russia (N=1135), Slovenia (N=1111), Ukraine (N=1146), Georgia
(N=1015).14
Ukraine, and Belarus), the three Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), and two Tran-
scaucasian countries (Armenia and Georgia) Missing from the map of the European part of
the former Soviet Union are Moldova and Azerbaijan.  Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Ma-
cedonia represent the Balkan countries.  And from Central Europe we cover Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, and Slovenia.  Serbia/Montenegro and Bosnia-
Herzegovina are missing for obvious reasons.
Measuring Democratic Performance
Individuals' support for democracy is measured by the following question:
"On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way
democracy is developing in [your country]?"
This response reflects attitudes toward a country's constitution in operation (Lane and
Ersson 1994, 194) or its constitutional reality (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995,
328).7
On the average, about a third of the citizens in the countries we cover were very or fairly
satisfied with the way democracy was working in 1995. Two thirds were not.  However, the
variation between countries is striking (see Figure 2, "democratic performance" bars). It
ranges from Albania8, where 61 percent of its citizens were satisfied with democratic per-
formance, to Russia, where more than 90 percent were dissatisfied.  We must reiterate that
we are not engaged in a systematic effort to explain differences between countries, but
rather we concentrate our analysis on the individual level.  Our interest in the different
countries is merely to check whether or not the individual level relationships hold up in
various contexts. However, it is noteworthy that, compared to the present research as well
as that conducted in Western Europe and Latin America, Russia pushes the range to a new
minimum.
                                               
7 A slightly differently worded question has been used in much of the research into support of democracy
in Western democracies.  Clarke and Kornberg (1992a; 1992b) as well as Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svens-
son (1995) report a variety of tests showing a high degree of construct validity.
8 It must be noted that this survey preceded widespread violence following an election generally suspected
of severe irregularities as well as the financial collapse that wiped out a major portion of private savings
in the country.15
Figure 2: Democratic Performance and Citizens' Assessments of Human Rights
Measuring Political Outputs
Our indicator of political outputs taps the citizens' evaluations of human rights conditions in
their country.  The question reads:
"How much respect is there for individual human rights nowadays in [your country]?  Do you feel there is a
lot of respect for individual human rights, some respect, not much respect or no respect at all?"
The percentage of respondents indicating there was a lot or some respect for human rights
are indicated in Figure 2 by the second bar to the right for each country. Unlike in most of
the older democratic regimes, questions of individual human rights are relatively high on the
agenda of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, no doubt because they were
so wretched so recently.  New constitutions have been written in most of the countries we
are studying.  And, given the great number of ethnic minorities, a constitution that guaran-
tees individual human rights is of the highest importance, at least to these groups.  In addi-
tion, a good record on human rights is often a precondition for membership in international
organizations or for the availability of support for the reconstruction of these countries.
When, for example, membership in the Council of Europe was denied to Croatia , this
caused much public debate and attention to the issue.  And, of course, the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina demonstrated to all its neighbors what it is like when human rights are tram-
pled with impunity.16
Overall, 43 percent of Central and East Europeans believe that there is quite a lot or some
respect for individual rights in their countries (Figure 2).  As with satisfaction with democ-
racy, however, there is a wide range of difference between countries.  Eighty percent of
Croatians evaluate human rights performance high, whereas the Russians, Ukrainians, and
Lithuanians are quite pessimistic about the condition of human rights in their respective
countries.
Measuring Economic Outputs
Previous research has shown that public perceptions of both personal (egocentric) and na-
tional (sociotropic) economic conditions are related to system support.  Unfortunately the
surveys we are using did not include questions addressed precisely to those economic con-
siderations.  Thus, we rely on the respondents' expressed expectations for the financial
situation of the household.  The specific question is:
"Over the next twelve months, do you expect that the financial situation of your household will get a lot
better, a little better, stay the same, get a little worse, get a lot worse?"
This indicator can, to some extent, be related to expectations about the development of the
national economy, as everybody' income is broadly affected by general economic develop-
ment, but it is certainly the case that our indicator leans more in the direction of egocentric
rather than sociotropic projections.9
As previously with estimates of human rights conditions, the percentage of respondents
expecting their own economic situation to be a lot or a little bit better is illustrated in by
each country's second bar in Figure 3, the top bars being, again, the percentage expressing
satisfaction with the general performance of democracy.  Thirty-four percent of all respon-
dents believe that their financial situations will be better over the next year.  Again, the Al-
banians (sadly, as it turned out) were most euphoric about their financial future.  The eco-
nomic expectations of the Hungarians are the least optimistic.  Ad hoc speculations are
tempting, but not especially relevant to the present analysis.
                                               
9 In 1991 both egocentric and sociotropic projections were included in the CEEB surveys (11 countries).
Pearsonian correlations between the evaluation of the future development of the country's economic
situation and the evaluation of the future development of the financial situation of the citizen's household
ranged from .47 in Estonia and the Czech Republic to .61 in Russia. The overall mean correlation was
.54.17
Figure 3: Democratic Performance and Citizens' Assessments of the Economy
We are concerned with the precursors of civic culture and shorter range conditions that help
get the process of developing democratic legitimacy started.  Thus, it is essential to measure
values and attitudes at the level of individual citizens, as indeed we have done here.  How-
ever, a side benefit of our mode of presentation of these data in Figures 2 and 3 is that we
as well get a nice picture of the general aggregate (macro) relationships.  The countries are
arrayed from top to bottom by the percentage of respondents satisfied with democratic
performance in their country.  It is clear that, as that percentage declines, so, generally,
does the ratio of citizens rating both human rights and economic performance positively.
While interesting, however, it is not our purpose here to explain those macro relationships.
Rather, we are concerned with the match in citizens' individual assessments of democracy,
human rights, and economic circumstances.  It is to those linkages that we now turn.
Human Rights Assessment, Economic Expectations, and Support for Democracy
Do political outputs, as indicated by citizens' assessments of the condition of human rights,
have an impact on support for democracy?  And what is the relative importance of these
assessments when compared to economic optimism or pessimism?  The bivariate relation-
ships for each country, presented in the first two columns of coefficients in Table 1, are very
interesting.  Two general patterns are conveyed by these correlations.  First, all of the coef-
ficients are positive and highly significant.  Second, in all 18 countries, the association of18
support for democracy with human rights performance (political outputs, in Figure 1) is
stronger than with economic expectations (economic outputs, in Figure 2).  The mean cor-
relations are .47 and .32, respectively.
Table 1: Predicting Democratic Performance with Assessments of Human Rights
Conditions and Economic Prospects (18 Central and Eastern European Countries,



































































































































Scales: Support for Democracy: 1 = high, 4 = low.
Human Rights:  1 = high, 4 = low.
Economic Prospects: 1 = high, 5 = low.
All coefficients significant at the .000 level.
Multiple regression, controlling for the independent roles of human rights versus economic
assessments vis-à-vis democratic performance, provides even more striking reinforcement of
our thesis,  as seen in the three columns to the right in Table 1.  At .28, the mean R² is quite
respectable for survey research. It ranges from a high of .46 in Albania to .12 in Slovenia.
Thus, the individual level relationships are quite robust and can be replicated with basically
the same result in each of 18 countries.  In every country assessments of human rights con-19
ditions and of personal financial circumstances are significantly related to positive evalua-
tions of democratic performance.  And in every country the slope for human rights is
steeper than for economic prospects.
We have taken the analysis a step further and followed Christopher Achen's lead in using
the level-importance statistic.10  This device has the attractive property that it has a
straightforward interpretation of the net effect of each independent variable, accommodat-
ing scale differences.  We have calculated the level-importance statistic for our 18 samples,
with the results reported in Figure 4.  The length of the two bars show for each country
how many units of increase in democratic performance, on a four-point scale, would pre-
sumably result from a unit increase in assessments of human rights (top bar) and economic
conditions (bottom bar), respectively. Satisfaction with democratic performance is most
closely linked to human rights conditions in Georgia, and least in Slovenia.  While, again,
not engaged in a systematic effort to explain cross-national variations, we cannot resist
speculation that the relative importance of human rights for democratic satisfaction is
probably in good measure due to the relative improvement since the "bad old days."11  The
Slovenes were about the most open of the formerly communist countries, while Georgia
was among the least.
In general, in all countries but Albania, views on human rights are stronger predictors of
democratic satisfaction than are economic assessments. Respect for individual human rights
is about twice as important for the generation of support for democracy than are personal
economic expectations.  The implicit contrast between the memory of the bad old days of
communism and the current condition of individual freedom seems to be a substantially
more potent force for democratic legitimacy, at least in the transition period, than are indi-
vidual economic circumstances.  That is certainly consistent with our speculations as to the
motives of those who took to the streets to bring down the communist regimes of yore.
                                               
10 This procedure allows us to compute unit increases in Y as a function of unit increases each of  several
Xs, even when the later have different scale composition.  See the note to Table 1.  For an elaboration of
the procedure, see Achen (1983).
11 At some point, the refinement of the line of research represented here will have to give attention to rather
more specific facets of the conditions under communism and to the chain of events following its fall.
Both Georgia and Croatia, among the top ranked countries in terms of the relevance of concern for hu-
man rights to estimates of democratic performance,  at the time of the survey had each just come away
from a bloody civil war.  Thus, the contrast of the situation in 1995 to very shortly before was enriched by
that dreadful experience. There is promise here for substantial refinement of the transition model in
terms of collective experiences.20
Figure 4: Relative Importance of Human Rights vs. Economy for Predicting Democratic
Performance
Conclusion
By the middle of the 1990s, the formal structures of representative democracy had been put
in place in all of the Central and Eastern European countries.  We have argued that the
long-term success of these experiments in democracy depends on the development of a civil
society and its individual counterpart, a civic culture.  And those socio-cultural develop-
ments rest on some level and breadth of citizens' approval of regime performance.  Two
different types of performance have been distinguished:  human rights conditions and per-
sonal economic circumstances.
We have aligned ourselves with the position that citizens of the formerly communist
countries are especially well-suited to make an assessment of the condition of individual
freedom, given the recency of their experiences with systems dedicated to its severe restric-
tion.  Unlike western democracies that have long learned to take for granted the virtues of
omission -- avoidance of bad actions -- of their governments, the adult citizens of the for-
merly communist countries can easily recall when those virtues were seriously compro-
mised. Of course, we would expect the relevance of such recollections to system legitimacy
to decline over the longer term.  It is not that we expect citizens to forget the past. Rather,
we expect they will, in the course of mortal time, be replaced by age cohorts who have not21
had direct experience with the human rights abuses of the communist regimes.  An interest-
ing question for the future will be whether or not the relevance of this form of political out-
put becomes, fortunately, taken for granted and then declines in its ability to explain satis-
faction with the status of democracy.
Economic performance, to the extent that it can be viewed as a product of state action,
indicates important virtues of commission, that is, the pursuit of worthwhile positive ac-
tions.  Assessment of one's economic circumstances entails relatively short term compari-
sons and is not dependent, usually, on such dramatic events as the overthrow or collapse of
a regime.  As has long been supported with the evidence offered by democratic theorists,
extended positive economic performance builds a firm foundation under democratic proc-
esses.  And, likewise, long term economic malaise can weaken that foundation.  Our as-
sumption would be that just as the immediate relevance of human rights performance indi-
cators will decline as they are taken more and more for granted by the citizenry so will
longer-term experiences with the economy probably take on increased salience to demo-
cratic legitimacy.
Our analysis shows that both political and economic outputs, as assessed by individual
survey respondents, are positively related to evaluations of democratic performance.  Thus,
if a citizen perceives a positive development in household income, assessment of democratic
performance also goes up.  The same is true if the citizen perceives that there is respect for
individual human rights. Without dismissing the relevance of either, we nonetheless found it
interesting, especially in light of the general emphasis given by scholars to economic per-
formance, that the human rights circumstances were more important than economics at this
critical junction in history.
This finding has significant implications for future research on the persistence of democ-
racy in post-revolutionary systems.  It calls for more complex measurement strategies to
discover whether or not it holds up under more focused scrutiny.  Our research also points
to the need for multi-level analyses in order to explain differences in satisfaction between
countries systematically.  We readily acknowledge the probability that our findings are
somewhat time-bounded.  That, however, merely underscores their importance as part of a
model of democratic transition.  Citizens recently having experienced the demise of dicta-
torship will apparently forgive the new fledgling democracy much more in the economic
realm than they will with regard to individual human rights.  In the long run, virtues of
commission are expected, regardless of regime type.
Virtues of omission, however,  have a more immediate legitimizing impact. Policy makers
in new democracies would be wise to pursue policies that build bridges across the transition
period. Human rights belong on the top of the list. A half decade and a few elections after
the fall of communism, the citizens had not forgotten why they faced down the old regimes.22
It was not for groceries that the people of the Central and Eastern European countries took
to the streets between 1989 and 1991.  It was for freedom.
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